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ABSTRACT 
Whether or not chimpanzees have the ability to mentally 
represent others' mental states or theory of mind (ToM) has 
yet to be definitively established. This results from three 
problems. First, modular theory of mind accounts lead re-
searchers to adopt an either/or approach to psychological 
faculties which obfuscates both within- and across-species 
variability. Second, present research continues to rely on the 
continued trend to polarize nature and nurture. Third, the 
bulk of the work compares humans with chimpanzees rather 
than looking at the entire range of primate species. I propose 
"degree approach" by way of the Integrated Causal Model 
which particularizes the key components to ToM while main-
taining the tenets of modularity theory. According to this 
account, while chimpanzees may not have a ToM that is equal 
to our own, they nevertheless exhibit behaviors that are 
indeed indicative of having one as illustrated by comparison 
to other extant primate research. 
t t t 
Given our close genetic relationship to chim-
panzees (Pan paniscus), much can be learned about our 
own cognitive processes by way of comparison. How-
ever, the reverse is also true; with what we know of our 
own minds, what can we learn about other organisms' 
mental activities, and what are the constraints that 
limit our ability to acquire such knowledge? The best 
prepared theory for making such an inquiry is that of 
the computational or modular mind (Fodor 1983). How-
ever, when comparing psychological faculties of two 
closely related species, new questions emerge that re-
quire rethinking previously held conceptions of the lim-
its of particular faculties. Two primary problems arise 
upon examination of chimpanzee ToM within the modu-
lar framework: namely, the tendency to think of mod-
ules in an either/or manner ("you have the faculty or 
not," see Povinelli and Vonk 2004, Tomasello et al. 
2003) and the tendency to polarize unnecessarily na-
tUre (what is innate) and nurture (what is learned). 
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The difficulty of finding definitive evidence is quite a 
task to overcome, as we tend to anthropomorphize our 
subjects in order to explain their behavior. 
MENTAL ORGANS 
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
According to the most conservative 'definitions of 
modularity, there are four key components to a modu-
lar faculty of mind: encapsulation, domain specificity, 
inaccessibility, and innateness (Fodor 1983, 1998, 
Sperber 2002). Encapsulation, or "informational en-
capsulation" is the idea that within them, modules 
have hardwired information which informs perception. 
Domain-specificity is a given module's body of relevant 
. knowledge; it is specifically designed for a particular 
body of information (Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994), e.g. 
language, a template-system of intuitive ontology, na-
ive physics, etc. (Boyer 2001, Chomsky 2000, Vosniadou 
1994). "Inaccessibility" refers to the idea that while 
incoming stimuli can alter neither the encapsulated 
information nor the state of the information therein, 
the target module cannot inform outside information 
(Fodor 1998). Put in an evolutionary perspective, the 
question becomes how such discrete cognitive functions 
evolve, given they are genetically determined. 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) aptly articulate the 
main theoretical difference between behaviorist and 
nativist approaches to the mind. They distinguish 
between what they call the Standard Social Science 
Model (SSSM) and the Integrated Causal Model (ICM). 
The SSSM is maintains that "the central concept in 
psychology [has been] learning," rather than innate-
ness (1992). In other words, most behavior is learned, 
rather than an expression of genetically endowed facul-
ties and their relationship with learned information. 
And such learning, according to the SSSM, must be 
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"equipotential, content-free, content-independent, gen-
eral-purpose, domain -general.. . these mechanisms [of 
learning] must be constructed in such a way that they 
can absorb any kind of cultural message or environ-
mental input equally well" (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). 
The ICM, on the other hand, attempts to locate specific 
"mental organs" (Chomsky 1980) of the mind, their 
function(s), and under what conditions are they func-
tion optimally. In sum, this dichotomy of nature/nur-
ture is problematically too simple when confronted with 
the growth of mental faculties, and the dichotomy-
based approach provides the first frame of dilemmas 
arising from previous investigations of chimpanzee and 
human ToM. There are two main assumptions that 
guide the following investigation: 1) some components 
of the mind are at the very least modular by Fodor's 
account (for a debate within the realm of computational 
psychology, see Fodor 2005, Pinker 2005a, 2005b) and 
2) the ToMM (theory of mind mechanism or module) is 
a module in this sense at least in humans. 
Baron-Cohen (1999) notes that there are eight be-
havioral requirements that must be met in order to 
grant an organism a ToM, namely: 1) intentionally 
communicating with others; 2) repairing failed commu-
nication with others; 3) teaching others; 4) intention-
ally persuading others; 5) intentionally deceiving oth-
ers; 6) building shared plans and goals; 7) intentionally 
sharing a focus or topic of intention; and 8) pretending. 
Baron-Cohen unnecessarily separates "persuasion" and 
"deception" as deception is simply a specific form of 
persuasion; deception is successful persuasion of some-
thing false. However, all of the above requirements 
spring from the core qualities of a ToM: understanding 
beliefs, desires, and intentions in others. As discussed 
below, chimpanzees fulfill most of these requirements 
primarily by way of Machiavellian intelligence (see 
below) which, not surprisingly, is the most difficult to 
isolate in an experimental setting. 
Concerning the growth of innate faculties, our own 
species illustrates an interesting trend during develop-
ment. Gopnik and Wellman (1994) note that there are 
three main stages of a child's cognitive development 
with regards to the ToM. At two years, a child is 
equipped with two basic categories of mental activity, 
namely desires and perceptions. In other words, a 
landmark achievement in childhood development is an 
understanding of others' mental states such as needs-
the understanding that "what is in the mind can change 
what is in the world"-and the understanding that 
"what is in the mind depends on what is in the world" 
(Gopnik and Wellman 1994). By three years of age, an 
elaboration of mental activities and states occurs. Such 
concepts of "think, know, remember, make-believe, 
dream" are understood as mental activities, while 5-
year-old mental states including "beliefs [and false-
beliefs], pretences, and images" are but a few of the 
psychological categories acquired by normally devel-
oped children. 
Baron-Cohen's (1997) groundbreaking essay on 
"mind-blindness" of autistic children who lack or have 
an impaired ToM illustrates that understanding men-
tal states is quite a task-if possible-for individuals 
afflicted with such disorders. In this domain of cogni-
tive processing, one would expect, then, that chimpan-
zees would behave in a similar manner to autists who 
have impaired theory of mind mechanism or module 
(ToMM). This raises the first problem with an Either/ 
Or approach to ToM and modularity in general: ifmod-
ules can be impaired, certainly there are aspects of a 
given faculty that are operational, therefore implying 
that modules have degrees of functionality. Take for 
instance, individuals who suffer from Asperger's Syn-
drome (AS). AS is placed on what is called the "Autism 
Spectrum," just short of high-functioning autism (Baron-
Cohen 2003). Arguably, AS is a step above Attention 
Deficit Disorder (ADD) and Attention Deficit and Hy-
peractivity Disorder (ADHD) since the symptoms rel-
evant to ToM (e.g. difficulty with empathy, poor social 
interaction, etc.) clearly overlap with that of AS and 
high-functioning autism (Booth et al. 2003, Clark et al. 
1999, Williams 2004). 
Individuals who are diagnosed with AS, ADD, and 
ADHD exhibit a number of behaviors that are found 
among autists who have impairments of what consti-
tutes a ToM, ranging from a less functioning sense of 
empathy, difficulty in social settings, etc. Frith and 
Happe (1999) note that evidence suggests children with 
AS are not as good as normally functioning children at 
attributing mental states, but certainly improve their 
ability to do so as they develop, unlike those with 
autism. Such difficulties are the result of a less elabo-
rate ToM. This, in turn, implies that ToM ought to be 
measured by way of a spectrum or "host of symptoms" 
rather than as a present/absent module. 
Can such a spectrum, then, extend to chimpanzees? 
This question represents another problem with the 
Either/Or approach to modularity: if there is indeed 
variation within species in terms ofthe functioning of a 
module, is there inter-species variability of the same 
faculty? Ifwe are to conceptualize modules as "mental 
organs," should we not then acknowledge the possibil-
ity for variability across species as we would under-
stand differences in the heart, brain, eyes and other 
organs? Evolutionarily, the human eye was not se-
lected for per se, but rather the gradual developments 
of the eye, however, were (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). 
We should think of modules in the same manner. 
CHIMPANZEE THEORY OF MIND 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) were the first to ask 
whether chimpanzees have a ToM, and by extension, a 
ToMM. They argue that an individual's ability to at-
tribute mental states to another is not a recent develop-
ment but rather an old faculty. The question of whether 
or not the chimpanzee (or human, for that matter) is 
correct in his/her inference of attributing a mental state 
to another is irrelevant (but interesting)-the question 
is whether such inferences occur. Byrne and Whiten 
(1992) elaborate: "If an individual is able to respond 
differentially, according to the beliefs and desires of 
another individual (rather than according to the other's 
overt behaviour), then it possesses a theory of mind." 
In sum, then, a behavior exhibiting a reaction based on 
an understanding of another's beliefs and desires would 
be the shadow cast from the substance of the ToMM. 
While most argue that "reading minds" is an innate 
faculty of our species and-by extension-chimpan-
zees, others argue that such a trait is wholly learned. 
For instance, Perner et al. (1994) argue that children 
with more siblings learn to infer others' mental states 
quicker than those with fewer siblings; and, therefore, 
a ToM is learned. The main problem with the thesis of 
Perner et al. is the fact that they confuse mastery of 
mind reading with the ability to read minds. In other 
words, if a child is not employing or "exercising" this 
faculty, they will not be as adept at identifying false-
beliefs, intentions, etc. to a given agent. It should be 
argued, however, that having more siblings better pre-
pares the ToMM, rather than actually "bestowing" it 
upon an individual. Perner et al. (1994) contend that 
their findings create a "serious problem for nativist 
proposals and various developmental explanations re-
lying on internal maturation." Unfortunately, these 
authors remain unclear regarding the distinction be-
tween learned vs. developed (what is already there) 
when they claim that "the finding that siblings help 
develop a theory of mind is compatible with the 
sociocognitive tradition [which emphasizes] intellectual 
progress as a function of social interaction among peers 
and view intellectual growth as a process of internaliz-
ing the knowledge already incorporated in the social 
interaction" (1994). 
In sum, the data of Perner et al. do not create 
problems for "nativist proposals" as they claim-if any-
thing they support them, as "poverty of the stimulus" 
arguments contend (see below for "Plato's problem"). 
Put differently, Chomsky (1980) argues that "a central 
part of what we call 'learning' is actually better under-
stood as the growth of cognitive structures [which are 
innately endowed] along an internally directed course 
under the triggering and partially shaping effect of the 
environment." If this truly is the case, one may feasibly 
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pose the question to Perner et al.: where did only-
children "learn" a theory of mind? 
If the answer is from the parents, that would cer-
tainly not disqualify a single child from ''learning'' a 
theory of mind, but rather reducing the amount of 
stimulation that engages the ToMM. But "poverty of 
the stimulus" arguments contend that the stimulus 
itself is impoverished (in this case, behavior)-a great 
deal of our thinking is the result of inference-making 
by way of innate cognitive structures rather than a 
recording of all behaviors and outcomes (Boyer 2001). 
What we see is extremely limited-what we intuit is 
just as, if not more, important than the behaviors that 
stimulate mental activity (Fodor 1984). In sum, then, 
the question of ToM should not spring from the all-too 
simplistic dichotomy of nature/nurture but rather how 
these two interact (Richerson and Boyd 2005). The 
same may be said of chimpanzees raised in captivity 
that "learn" behaviors indicative of a ToM as discussed 
below. 
Machiavellianism has been defined as "a strategy 
of social conduct that involves manipulating others for 
personal gain, often against the other's self-interest" 
(Wilson et al. 1996, quoted in Byrne and Whiten 1997). 
If a chimpanzee fools another in order. to, acquire re-
sources (sexual or nutritional) for example, the "fool-
ing" alone does not necessarily suggest a ToM immedi-
ately. On the other hand, such acts of deception which 
rely on "whether an individual can discriminate 
another's false belief would be the most convincing way 
to demonstrate a true reading of 'mind"' (Whiten 1997). 
Has this been demonstrated? 
Franz de Waal (2000) recounts how a chimpanzee 
called Yeroen mildly hurt his hand in a fight with 
another chimp named Nikkie. One observer noticed 
that Yeroen only limped when Nikkie was around. 
Franz de Waal confirmed this when he noticed that 
once Yeroen was out ofNikkie's field of vision , he would 
walk normally. Not only does this imply that chimpan-
zees are aware that "seeing is knowing" (see below), but 
also that an individual chimp wanted another to believe 
he was hurt. This behavior lasted a week, during which 
Yeroen monitored Nikkie to see ifhe was being watched 
(Ibid.). This example fulfills not only the "pretending" 
qualification of possessing a ToM but the "persuasion" 
and "deception" components as well. The next group-
ing of criteria falls under the general heading of "social" 
or "shared intentions." 
Tomasello et al. (2004) argue that the primary dis-
tinction between our own psychological faculties and 
that of other species is the ability to cooperate with 
other individuals to accomplish the same goal, a trait 
with which human individuals affected by autism and 
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AS have troubles. What immediately comes to mind is 
the question of chimpanzee collaborative hunting, which 
Tomasello et al. (2004) consider. The authors deter-
mine such cooperation has no difference from hunting 
carried out by other social mammals (e.g. lions and 
wolves), which operates on impulse and opportunistic 
frenzies. In addition, they find it "almost unimaginable 
that two chimpanzees might spontaneously do some-
thing as simple as carry something together or help one 
another make a tool." In the case discussed below, it is 
clear that chimpanzees-if given the chance-will be-
have in a manner that benefits the agent solely rather 
than any cooperative behavior that would indicate a 
shared intention. 
However, Tomasello et al. overlook the fact that 
chimpanzees will act cooperatively by forging coalitions 
to overthrow an alpha male, let alone work together to 
perpetuate the reign of an alpha (de Waal 2000, Goodall 
1990). It should be noted that coalitions are created at 
fantastically frequent rates, (ca. 1,000-1,500 per year 
in captivity), but the overthrowing of an alpha does not 
(de Waal 2000). If this irrefutable fact of coalition-
building to overthrow an alpha were a result from 
"observation" (that is, assuming chimpanzees are true 
behaviorists), it would be quite a feat to explain coali-
tion forging and alpha-overthrowing in such terms. 
Individuals participating would collectively have to un-
derstand that their goal is, indeed, to get rid of an 
existing alpha. If chimpanzees were incapable of doing 
so, all those involved in the toppling of an alpha would 
have to have already observed not only the removal of 
an alpha but also a collaborative effort to do so. More-
over, they would have to be able to understand the 
outcome as a result from the collaborative effort ifthey 
are to repeat the process. Individuals who build coali-
tions are obviously goal-oriented and require assis-
tance from others to achieve this goal. This suggests, 
indeed, that chimpanzees have a basic ToM. 
Mundane, everyday behaviors, however, are far bet-
ter indicators for shared intentionality. Franz De Waal 
(2000), for instance, observed that individual chimpan-
zees will hold enormous branches for others to climb 
into trees guarded by electrical fence. The branches 
are placed in a manner that requires one individual to 
reinforce the instability of the branch while another 
climbs the branches in order to gather otherwise unob-
tainable leaves. Even an adult helping an infant out of 
a tree indicates that there is some degree of sharing 
intentions by way of understanding another's predica-
ment. Moreover, after engaging in conflict, chimpan-
zees will avoid each other until one of the combatants 
expresses a behavior indicative of a truce (e.g. extend-
ing a hand). Such a "collaborative" avoidance not only 
indicates mutual animosity, but also suggests that each 
individual involved in a conflict "keep in mind" that 
alleviating the tension has yet to occur (de WaaI2000). 
Turning to a related question: is seeing believing or 
indicative of understanding another's mental states? 
More specifically, does joint attention imply shared in-
tention? Flombaum and Santos (2005) recently pub-
lished findings that suggest rhesus monkeys (Macaca 
mulatta) are equipped with the understanding that a 
researcher's inability to see a hidden grape provides an 
opportunity to steal it. This begs for more research 
conducted with the full range of primates available for 
study (see below for anecdotal evidence). Povinelli and 
Eddy (1996a) conducted a study to determine whether 
chimpanzees followed a human's gaze. In one case, the 
human looked at a specific location with only his eyes, 
while in another case the human looked with both eyes 
and head. They found that "subjects looked where the 
human was looking equally often whether or not the 
head was moved, demonstrating the efficacy of eye 
direction alone" (Tomasello and Call 1997). 
In another experiment (Povinelli and Eddy 1996b), 
researchers stared directly at a Plexiglas wall that was 
between the chimpanzee and a distant wall. The as-
sumption was that the chimps would bypass the wall, 
rather than inspect it, if the line of gaze were of no 
particular significance in the chimps' minds. However, 
chimps consistently looked at both sides of the parti-
tion-with particular emphasis on the side available to 
the researcher's view-rather than exhibiting a pri-
mary concern with the wall at the end of the room. In 
sum, chimpanzees determined that the Plexiglas wall 
was of the researcher's interest, rather than blindly 
following his line of vision. 
Franz de Waal (2000) also reports an occasion when 
researchers hid a number of fruits in an enclosed area. 
Chimpanzees in an area close saw the researchers en-
ter the area-with a box full of fruit-then leave the 
area with an empty box. When the chimps were al-
lowed into the area, they searched "madly" without 
finding any of the fruit. One chimp, Dandy, passed by 
the hidden fruit without acknowledging them. Later, 
when the other apes were sleeping, Dandy made a "bee-
line" to the fruits, dug them up and quietly ate them 
without the others' awareness (2000). Even ifthis were 
not the first time Dandy behaved with such cunning, he 
still would require an understanding that if he sup-
pressed acknowledgment of the fruit, others would not 
enjoy the bounty. Not only was Dandy planning, but 
also intentionally, and probably consciously, deceiving 
others in order to better himself. 
Elsewhere, Byrne and Whiten (1992) review the 
complexity of tactical deception. Obviously, "Acts of 
deception involve other primates: as objects to be ma-
nipulated, as social tools to manipulate others, or even 
sometimes as the resource to be gained." On the other 
hand, it also implies that the deceivers/deceived must 
be able to both retaliate and remember. The authors 
note that "the two Pan species and the Papio baboons 
are significantly overrepresented in records of decep-
tion. By contrast, no clear case of deception has yet been 
reported for strepsirhine primates or tarsiers" (Byrne 
and Whiten 1992). The data collected by Byrne and 
Whiten were exclusively anecdotal, which opens the 
procedural doors to many problems. Povinelli and Vonk 
(2003) rightly suggest that anecdotal evidence often 
"presupposes a behavioral abstraction" because our own 
ToMs are at work as mentioned below in the squirrel 
example. However, note that even with Byrne and 
Whiten's study, researchers potential ToM attribution 
stops with a large body of the Prosimii suborder indi-
cating that such "presuppositions" are selective. 
In other words, anecdotal "evidence" for chimpan-
zees' mental representations inherently relies on the 
assumption that representations of behaviors already 
occur-something which has yet to be proven, accord-
ing to Povinelli and Vonk (2003). So, for instance, if one 
were to observe a chimpanzee deceiving another into 
thinking he does not have food, the observer is already 
attributing an understanding of mental states to the 
chimpanzee without testing. The problems with experi-
mental procedures that attempt to reveal definitively 
that chimps have an understanding of others' mental 
states, however, are equally problematic for a variety of 
reasons. 
DISCUSSION 
One must be wary when regarding certain behav-
iors as indicators of a ToM. Take, for example, a 
squirrel that takes flight each time a human approaches. 
While it may be inferred that the squirrel has a ToM 
because it has an understanding ofthe human's mental 
state (e.g. "wanting to eat it"), such a conclusion ignores 
the possibility that the squirrel is reacting to the hu-
man and not its mental states. However, the reverse 
tactic of "turning off our ToM" creates even more prob-
lems. Gopnik creates a first-person narrative describ-
ing the world according to an autist. People sitting 
around the individual are described as "bags of skin 
[that] are draped over chairs, and stuffed into pieces of 
cloth, they shift and protrude in unexpected ways" 
(unpublished essay quoted in Baron-Cohen 1997). Are 
we to believe, then, that chimpanzees truly look at the 
world-especially their fellow chimps-in this man-
ner? Unfortunately, we tend to grant agency without 
necessarily being aware of it. In other words, much of 
the time we do not look at others and acknowledge the 
fact that we are seeing much more than "hats and coats 
which could conceal automatons" (Descartes 1998). The 
information that is encapsulated is the attribution of 
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agency, and arguably with experience, this attribution 
is elaborated and specified: in the case of our own 
species, the mental states "dreaming" and "making-
believe" are not innate, but elaborations or outgrowths 
of an agency-detection system (i.e. the ToMM). In the 
case of chimpanzees, ToM seems less specific or sophis-
ticated-rather than completely absent (see below). The 
question, then, turns itself inward: are we simply an-
thropomorphizing chimpanzees because of our own in-
nate faculties? 
Anthropomorphism has been included in Brown's 
human universals, a characteristic that is demonstrated 
around the world by all peoples (Brown 1991). While 
Brown notes that this trait is generally found in reli-
gious contexts, anthropomorphizing occurs in other con-
texts as well. One common view of anthropomorphism 
is the notion that our species animates certain entities 
(e.g. gods, ghosts, chimpanzees, etc.) in order to under-
stand them better and to mitigate fears surrounding 
them. Boyer (2001) rightly observes that firstly, "gods 
and spirits are not represented as having human fea-
tures in general but as having minds, which is much 
more specific" and secondly, "the concept of a mind is 
not exclusively human," meaning we attribute agency 
to all entities rendered intentional. In other words, we 
intuitively (i.e. naturally) attribute a will and desires to 
animate entities-this is the crux of anthropomorphism. 
Are primate psychologists guilty of inappropriately at-
tributing "a mind" to chimpanzees in this case? 
Povinelli and Vonk (2003) suggest that the chim-
panzee mind seems so much like our own because "the 
human mind may have evolved a unique mental sys-
tem that cannot help distorting the chimpanzee's mind, 
obligatorily recreating it in its own image." Like reli-
gious ideas, we may be projecting our own qualities on 
chimpanzees by granting them a ToM because of our 
own ToM. However, if in fact chimpanzees do have 
such an understanding of others' mental states, and we 
agree that they do, we would still be anthropomorphiz-
ing-we would simply be accurate in our inference-
making. Moreover, "turning off' our own ToM in order 
to understand another's mental states is not a logica\ 
possibility; we require our ability to represent mentally 
other's mental states in order to determine whether or 
not he/she/it is able to do likewise. In other words, 
determining whether a chimpanzee has a ToM (a men-
tal state) is possible only if we are allowed to infer 
mental states. 
In what may be the most comprehensive account of 
the complexity of the present debate, Heyes (1998) 
proposes an experimental study designed to test whether 
or not chimpanzees could follow the sight-path of re-
searchers wearing different goggles (opaque and trans-
lucent). The chimps would be primed to learn the 
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difference between the goggles. The hypothesis was 
that if chimps did indeed have a ToM, they would not 
bother to follow the gaze of a researcher wearing the 
opaque goggles. Kamawar and Olson (1998) conducted 
this study with children. While 85% successfully passed 
the ToM tasks, half of these passed Heyes' experiment. 
In this case, researchers are demanding more from 
chimpanzees than humans. Andrews (2005) rightly 
argues that even a modified version of Heyes' experi-
ment proposed by Povinelli and Vonk (2004) also as-
sumes that human children do not have a ToM because 
of their reliance on the assumption that predicting 
behavior rather than explaining behavior is the best 
indicator of the presence of a ToM. Moreover, as ar-
gued below, all present experimental studies fail sim-
ply because they rely on behaviorist (i.e. a persistent 
failure of the SSSM) interpretations of mental activity 
(i.e. solved by the ICM). 
False-belieftasks are designed to determine whether 
or not an individual is capable of understanding that 
others may entertain an incorrect perception. While 
chimpanzees have shown great difficulty with attribut-
ing a false-beliefto other individuals compared to nor-
mally functioning children, some tasks they eventually 
learn (Call and Tomasello 1999). Autistic children fail 
these tasks consistently whereas children with Down's 
syndrome are successful (which is also indicative of a 
ToMM; Baron-Cohen 1997). However, there should be 
a clear distinction between the ability to understand 
that another may be entertaining a false-belief and the 
prevention of a belief that one may not want another to 
have. As with the above-mentioned case of Dandy's 
concealment of fruit , he has also been observed conceal-
ing erections from a threatening alpha male. There are 
other cases of another non-alpha keeping his backs 
toward an alpha male while attempting copulation, 
constantly looking over his shoulder at the alpha (de 
Waal2000). 
Gordon (1998) casts doubt that even humans, on 
the other hand, have a ToM because interpreting our 
own quotidian social behavior depends primarily on 
such rapid computations of behavioral subtleties (e.g. 
vocal inflections) that do "not await casual analysis." 
In other words, our minds react to these observed mi-
nutiae, rather than an active mechanism abstracting 
such details into a mental category. There are a num-
ber of problems inherent in this position. First, if all of 
these "subtleties" that Gordon (1998) refers to are actu-
ally the sum-total ofthe stimuli, and behaviors that are 
a response to the processing ofthat sum-total, this still 
does not deny the possibility of a ToMM because such a 
module requires stimulation for engagement. Secondly, 
such arguments foreclose on the possibility of a "cre-
ative aspect" of chimpanzee behavior. The point is, 
Gordon is taking a purely behaviorist approach to the 
ToM-mostly a mental activity. 
In addition, what Gordon does not acknowledge, 
but alludes to (perhaps not consciously) is what Chomsky 
calls "Plato's problem": "How is it possible that we have 
the knowledge that we do have? What is the knowledge 
that we do have and on what basis could we possibly 
have acquired it?" (Chomsky 1980, 2004; Lightfoot 2005). 
The strict behaviorist assumes such knowledge is 
learned and behaviors are reacted to based on either 
previous experience or processing a number of subtle 
gestures that "do not await causal analysis." If such a 
suite of subtleties do not "await causal analysis," then 
such subtleties are arguably purely instinctual, rather 
than a choice on the part of an agent. This fits nicely 
with Fodor's definition of inaccessibility but denies the 
ability of researchers to explain such behaviors. In 
sum, then, the existence of a ToM cannot be ultimately 
"proven" behaviorally or "behavioralistically." 
Many have called such abilities "metarep-
resentations" (Sperber 2000). Andrew Whiten (2000) 
differentiates two types of met are presentations. Sense 
1 is "A mental representation of a mental representa-
tion." An example of this is (in your, the reader's, mind) 
"John believes in ghosts." You understand that John's 
belief in ghosts is a mental activity-so John's repre-
sentation is now yours, so to speak. Sense 2 is "A 
mental representation of a mental representation as a 
representation (Sperber 2000). So, your understanding 
that John's belief in ghosts is a representation is itself a 
representation. Do chimps have this ability? 
Povinelli and Vonk (2003) note that there are two 
things which supporters of chimp ToM must establish: 
a) that chimpanzees are capable of abstracting behav-
iors and b) they can mentally represent mental states 
(Sense 1). They argue that for the entire body of data 
produced by chimpanzee observation to be of any ex-
planatory value, only "behavioral abstractions will suf-
fice." Similar observations made by Scott (2001) divide 
the approaches between those who attribute ToM to 
chimpanzees and those who simply learn "from past 
experiences," in other words a representational memory 
of behavior rather than a representational understand-
ing of others' representations. However, as the elabo-
rate experiments that Call et al. (2004) conducted indi-
cate, chimpanzees not only have the ability-spontane-
ously-to interpret intentions (Sense 1), but also react 
to them based on researchers' intentions as untrained 
chimpanzees quickly learned to not bother waiting for 
food that researchers refused to give. 
Premack and Premack (1983, 2003) conducted a 
study in which the chimpanzees were shown video-
taped images of actors attempting to solve a number of 
problems. In the first test, ~n actor attempt~d to re~ch 
inaccessible bananas (hangIng overhead, lymg outsIde 
a cage, blocked by a large box). In another number of 
tests, actors were confronted with "malfunctioning 
equipment: a disconnected hose, a phonograph whose 
cord was unplugged, a gas heater that was unlit," etc. 
(Premack and Premack 2003). After viewing the vid-
eos, Sarah (the Premacks' test subject) was given an 
envelope with photos of the solution and solutions to 
other problems. Initially, Sarah chose the correct solu-
tion to 18 out of 20 problems. The Premacks note that 
her mistakes were likely due to "her ignorance of the 
difference between chimpanzee and human strength" 
(she "assumed" that a human could push a brick-filled 
box aside, rather than empty it) and "an unclear photo." 
Children, on the other hand who were presented with 
this task, failed 50 percent of the time. Even after 
altering the study to accommodate children's "subur-
ban lifestyles" (e.g. cookies out of reach on top of a 
refrigerator), they continued to fail at the same rate. 
The Premacks argue that the difference lies in the 
ability of chimps to identify, i.e. mentally represent, a 
"problem" rather than a simple sequence of events on a 
video. The chimps had to attribute agoal on the part of 
the actors presented in the film, whereas three-and-a-
half year old children failed at a larger rate due to their 
failure to attribute a goal to the actors. It would be 
highly informative to give the same tests to older chil-
dren, as their ToM is mostly fully functional (see above). 
Can one still maintain the stance that Sarah may have 
"learned" this ability-especially after being confronted 
with a novel test? Sarah represented not only the 
problem identified by the actors and the problem itself 
(Sense 1), but recognized it as a problem (Sense 2). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Is it then safe to think of the ToM in an Either/Or 
manner? If we discount the prescribed "collaborative 
intentionality," chimpanzees, it would seem, have the 
capacity to read other's minds-but with a limited num-
ber of abstraction-level mental state categories. The 
category which they fail to fulfill is likely concomitant 
to more socially complex animals-i.e. humans. If ToM 
is modular, "collaborative intentionality" should not 
necessarily be a condition-such an extra or more com-
plex system of social cognition is likely equipped with 
another cognitive mechanism at work-rather than 
more encapsulated information. In other words, chimp 
ToM is likely only equipped with the mental abstrac-
tions of "seeing" and "desiring," with an emphasis on 
how to exploit others properly in order to benefit oneself 
(egocentric) whereas human ToM can be employed to 
accommodate collaborative intentionality-arguably 
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made possible only by another psychological mecha-
nism. 
What a "degree" model would throw into question 
is how developed our own ToM truly is in terms of 
informational encapsulation and/or the limits of the 
representational outgrowth of this mechanism. For 
instance, it is probably not so much the case that "dream-
ing" is an innate concept, but such innate mental ab-
stractions such as "knowing" or "believing" are evolu-
tionarily sound mechanisms to have. It is also more 
likely that such initial characteristics of human ToM 
are not much different from a chimp's-we simply ob-
tain more stimuli, both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
which would expand our categories of others' mental 
states. In sum, then, a ToM spectrum should stimulate 
the question that there may be some variability in the 
information encapsulated within our modules (as indi-
cated by those with AS and high-functioning autism), 
just as there is variability in our eyes, stomachs, etc. In 
addition, it opens yet another question: is there vari-
ability in translation from essential information to be-
havior? Put differently, if our ToMM contains the same 
essential elements that a chimp's does, why is there a 
cognitive limitation on how it is used? 
The debate need not be black or white in the case of 
ToM. The question should not be whether or not chim-
panzees have a ToM, but rather to what degree. Even 
from the skeptics' corner (Povinelli and Vonk 2004), we 
see evidence of "seeing as knowing" in chimpanzees, 
but when compared to other primates, there is a clear 
divide. Conducting the same experiments with other 
primates, particularly the prosimians, will offer a truly 
robust body of comparative knowledge. From an evolu-
tionary standpoint, the chimpanzees' understanding of 
others' mental states may simply be regarded as less 
developed or more restricted than humans' yet more 
articulated than other primates as recent research sug-
gests. Moreover, determining whether any organism 
has a ToM requires one but also requires not relying 
solely on our own tendencies to infer mental states. 
Future experiments should be designed for chimpan-
zees to attempt to deceive others in order to solve a 
particular task without reflexively inferring that this 
already occurs. Observational and anecdotal data are 
equally important in order to observe chimpanzees and 
other primates interacting naturally. 
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